Clark v Ryan
Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486
Two vehicles collide on a highway. Does a jury need an expert to tell them what happened?
Superseded by legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 80
In the uniform Evidence Acts jurisdictions this common-law test has been displaced. Section 80(b) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and its State equivalents provide that “[e]vidence of an opinion is not inadmissible only because it is about ... a matter of common knowledge”, removing the limb this case relies on most heavily. Admissibility now runs through s 79(1): the witness must have specialised knowledge based on training, study or experience, and the opinion must be wholly or substantially based on that knowledge. Those are the two criteria French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ applied in Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21 under s 79(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) ([32]). Clark v Ryan still states the position at common law and where the uniform Acts do not apply, and the concerns it identifies are what s 79 is addressed to.
Qualified by Lang v The Queen [2023] HCA 29
At common law the first limb of this test has been loosened, at least by two Justices of the High Court. In Lang v The Queen, an appeal from Queensland decided at common law, Kiefel CJ and Gageler J, in their own joint reasons agreeing with Jagot J that the appeal should be dismissed, set out the traditional approach in the words Dixon CJ applied here (their footnote 6) and observe that “The traditional approach has come under strain” as developments in specialised knowledge have advanced ([9]). They continue: “Nor does it follow that evidence of the opinion of an expert is unavailable to assist the tribunal of fact merely because the tribunal of fact, whether a judge or a jury, could be expected in the absence of that expert evidence to work out their own explanation for events and behaviour making use of nothing more than the common knowledge and experience that can be attributed to them” ([9]). What remains a condition of admissibility at common law is “that the opinion be demonstrated to be based on specialised knowledge or experience of the expert that is beyond the common knowledge and experience attributable to the tribunal of fact” ([10]). This is not the Court’s holding. Jagot J restated the Clark v Ryan formulation without that gloss ([428]), and Gordon and Edelman JJ dissented. Treat it as a two-Justice signal about where the common law is moving, not as a displacement of the test.
What happened?
The case arose from a collision between two motor vehicles on a highway. A witness was called as an expert and gave opinion evidence about how the collision had come about. It was objected to, admitted, and the jury returned a verdict.
What did the Court decide?
The engineer’s evidence was wrongly admitted; it argued the plaintiff’s case for him. Verdict set aside, new trial ordered. McTiernan J dissented. Why was this evidence problematic?
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Opinion evidence from a witness of special skill is admissible only where the subject matter is such that inexperienced people are unlikely to form a correct judgment without assistance, and only from a witness whose profession or course of study gives more opportunity of judging than other people have.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Dixon CJ
Read judgment: pp 491–492 (opens in a new tab)
Dixon CJ adopts J. W. Smith’s formulation of the need for expert assistance and Vaughan Williams J’s observation about the witness’s qualifications, giving profession or study a wide meaning. He applies both requirements: Joy addressed matters jurors could determine themselves and gave opinions outside his expertise. These are grounds for holding the evidence inadmissible, which leads to the new trial, rather than incidental observations. This classification concerns Dixon CJ’s reasoning; the other judgments must not be treated as adopting every part of it merely because they agree in the orders.
Why does this case matter?
The error mattered: the verdict was set aside, a new trial ordered.
The judgment warns against witnesses generalising experience “as a universal law.”
Note the law has shifted. Uniform Evidence Acts now govern s 80(b) and s 79, with Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar the modern authority.
Exam and application relevance
Under uniform Evidence Acts, apply s 79 and s 80 directly; common knowledge is no longer a bar. Check specialised knowledge and scope witness by witness. At common law, ask this case’s two questions.
Check your understanding
The witness had real experience with vehicles. Why was that not enough to make his opinion admissible?