Bunning v Cross
Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54
The police obtained the evidence improperly, and it proves the offence. Does the impropriety mean the jury never hears it?
Qualified by Kadir v The Queen (2020) 267 CLR 109
In every uniform Evidence Act jurisdiction the common-law discretion has been replaced by s 138, and the replacement is not a restatement. Section 138(1) provides that improperly or illegally obtained evidence “is not to be admitted unless the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighs the undesirability of admitting evidence that has been obtained in the way in which the evidence was obtained” -- exclusion is the default and the tendering party must justify admission, where at common law the party seeking exclusion bore the burden. Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Edelman JJ trace the provision to the ALRC’s “modified form of the common law exclusionary public policy discretion articulated in Bunning v Cross”, the two modifications being “to place the onus on the tendering party to justify admission and to clearly articulate the factors informing the competing public interests” ([11]). Section 138 is also wider in reach: unlike Bunning it is not confined to criminal proceedings or to impropriety by law enforcement, so “the public interests that the court is required to weigh are broader” ([12]-[13]). Bunning is not spent -- in a criminal proceeding where police obtained the evidence, “the more focussed public interests identified in Bunning v Cross remain apt” ([13]) -- but in a uniform Evidence Act jurisdiction the analysis starts from s 138(1) and the factors in s 138(3), not from the common law.
Qualified by Potter (A Pseudonym) v The King [2026] HCA 25
Where a statute itself prohibits the use of unlawfully obtained material, the discretionary balance does not arise. In Potter the Court of Appeal of South Australia held that a covert recording had been made in contravention of s 4(1) of the Surveillance Devices Act 2016 (SA) but admitted it in the public policy discretion, citing Bunning. In the High Court the respondent conceded that the majority below “erred in concluding that the admissibility of the covert recording was governed by the exercise of the public policy discretion, as opposed to that evidence being necessarily excluded by the SDA”, and Gageler CJ, Gordon, Steward, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ, in a single joint judgment, said “that concession was correctly made” ([36]). Their footnote 23, at [33], identifies the discretion the Court of Appeal applied as Bunning’s (141 CLR 54 at 78-80). If the recording contravened s 4(1), its use at trial was prohibited by s 12(1), and “no question of any discretionary exclusion (or inclusion) of the evidence of the covert recording should have arisen” ([14]). The point was conceded rather than argued, and the appeal was dismissed on another ground: the recording was held lawfully made under s 4(2)(a)(ii). So before weighing the Bunning factors, ask whether a statute decides admissibility outright.
What happened?
A Perth patrolman suspected Bunning of drink-driving but skipped the roadside test. A station breathalyser read 0.190%. The magistrate found no reasonable grounds for that test, excluded the evidence, and dismissed the charge. Why exclude it?
What did the Court decide?
Bunning lost. The Full Court’s order was varied to direct conviction; the appeal was otherwise dismissed. Murphy J dissented.
Stephen and Aickin JJ gave the main joint reasons, focused heavily on the facts. They found the magistrate had wrongly focused on fairness to the accused, seeing no unfairness here. Instead, they said “large matters of public policy” were at stake.
They refused to set out fixed criteria in the abstract, fearing rules unsuited to future cases. Applying their approach to these facts, several specific factors pointed toward admitting the evidence.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Improperly or illegally obtained evidence is excluded not automatically but by a discretionary balance between the desirability of admitting probative evidence and the undesirability of the court appearing to condone the impropriety that produced it.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Stephen and Aickin JJ
Read judgment: p 75 (opens in a new tab), pp 80–81 (opens in a new tab)
The public-policy balance was necessary to Stephen and Aickin JJ’s conclusion that the magistrate’s discretion miscarried and that the breathalyser evidence should be admitted. Their Honours applied the competing considerations and directed conviction; Barwick CJ expressly agreed with their principles and conclusion on the exercise of the discretion. Jacobs J reached the result on the distinct basis that the evidence was lawfully obtained, while Murphy J dissented.
Why does this case matter?
The magistrate asked the wrong question: unfairness to the accused. Stephen and Aickin JJ said unfairness wasn’t the issue, like an unlawful search wasn’t “unfair” to the person searched.
Here, the balance favoured admitting the evidence. Yet Bunning remains central to exclusion arguments. Bunning bore the burden of justifying exclusion; this differs from how the burden sits under provisions cited elsewhere.
That’s why both sides cite Bunning. The answer lies in weighing factors, not assuming a fixed outcome either way.
Exam and application relevance
First, identify your regime. In a uniform Evidence Act jurisdiction, apply s 138, not the common law. Under s 138(1), the tendering party must justify admission. Work through the s 138(3) factors by name.
Where the common law applies, think carefully about cogency (how persuasive the evidence is). Does deliberate or reckless illegality change its role? Does mere mistake change it? Classify the impropriety first, then ask where cogency fits.
Check your understanding
Two cases, identical evidence and identical probative value. In one the police broke the law by mistake; in the other, deliberately. Why does cogency generally weigh differently in the two — and what kind of case did Stephen and Aickin JJ leave as an exception?