Negligence: duty of care and pure economic loss
The general rule and why it exists
Pure economic loss means loss that does not follow from injury to a person or damage to property.
In Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd, a buyer purchased a building with defective foundations. The court treated this loss as pure economic loss. It did not revisit the argument that physical damage to the building changed that classification.
In Mallonland Pty Ltd v Advanta Seeds Pty Ltd, the court set out the starting point. Ordinarily, a person does not owe a duty to take reasonable care to avoid causing reasonably foreseeable pure economic loss to someone else.
The court explained why this rule exists. Causing economic loss alone does not breach a legally protected interest of the plaintiff. There are also policy concerns about liability “in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.”
Foreseeing the loss is necessary for a duty to exist, but it is not enough on its own.
Matters the High Court examines
In Mallonland, the joint reasons point to several matters relevant to duty of care, though this grouping is the article’s own, not a fixed legal test, and is not meant to be exhaustive.
Assumption of responsibility means the defendant has undertaken, expressly or by implication, to take reasonable care for the plaintiff. Where this exists, a duty may well arise, though the defendant can limit or negate it by words or conduct.
Knowledge refers to the defendant actually knowing of the risk to a person or class, and the scale of loss that might follow. Such knowledge strengthens, but does not itself guarantee, a finding of duty.
Vulnerability means the plaintiff could not protect itself from the loss, including by shifting it onto the defendant through contract. Merely being likely to suffer loss is not enough. If the plaintiff could reasonably have protected itself, courts will often refuse to find a duty.
Indeterminacy concerns whether liability can realistically be calculated. If not, a duty will usually be denied. But even if the class of plaintiffs is identifiable, removing indeterminacy, this alone does not support finding a duty.
Finally, the joint reasons stressed that weighing these matters is not an “instinctive synthesis” — not just an intuitive overall judgment. Instead, it requires a reasoned chain of logic, built incrementally and by analogy with existing cases.
Vulnerability in the cases
In Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180, the respondent negligently spread bacterial wilt on a farmer’s land. Rules then barred potato imports from land near the infection, hurting the appellants’ business, though their land was undamaged. The appeal succeeded.
Gleeson CJ, agreeing with Gummow J, found a duty of care was owed. He pointed to land use, closeness to the infected land, the appellants’ vulnerability (their inability to protect themselves), and the respondent’s control over the activity. Judges wrote separately; Hayne J would have allowed only one appellant’s claim. Woolcock later described Perre as a case where plaintiffs could do nothing to protect themselves, but this was Woolcock’s own description, not something Perre itself held.
Woolcock reached the opposite result. An engineer had designed faulty foundations; a later purchaser sued over resulting damage. The case was decided on agreed facts only. The joint judges found no vulnerability: nothing showed the purchaser could not have protected itself by contract, and it was not alleged the defects were undiscoverable. The appeal failed.
The joint reasons noted that in Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609, a majority held a builder owed a duty to a later house purchaser. They doubted this depended on a strict line between dwellings and other buildings, but left open how important vulnerability generally is.
In Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 61288 (2014) 254 CLR 185, an owners corporation sued a builder over latent defects in common property. The High Court found no duty was owed. Both judgment groups treated the surrounding contracts as relevant to the owners corporation’s vulnerability, though French CJ also relied on strata legislation. French CJ saw the case as closer to Woolcock than to Bryan v Maloney.
A producer and its customers’ customers
In Mallonland, growers bought seed contaminated with shattercane, from a distributor the producer had authorised. They claimed pure economic loss, meaning financial loss not linked to injury or damage to their property. This loss was reasonably foreseeable, but the High Court still found the producer owed no duty of care.
The seed bags had prominent conditions. These said the buyer carried the risk of the seed’s fitness for use, and that the producer was not liable for loss from its negligence. The Court said this did more than disclaim legal liability: it defined the actual product being sold.
The producer knew some purchasers would suffer loss if the seed were contaminated. But it didn’t know this particular seed was contaminated, or that these growers would buy it.
The growers could have protected themselves by simply not planting the seed. They had to prove they couldn’t return unopened bags for a refund, but failed to do so.
The growers formed an identifiable group, which ruled out concerns about indeterminate liability. However, this fact alone did not help their case.
A New South Wales statutory duty for building defects
New South Wales also has a statutory duty for building defects. This sits alongside the common law position from Brookfield, not instead of it.
Section 37(1) of the Design and Building Practitioners Act 2020 (NSW) creates a duty. A person doing construction work must take reasonable care to avoid economic loss from building defects linked to that work.
The duty is owed to each owner of the land, and to later owners too (s 37(2)). For a strata scheme, the owners corporation is treated as an owner (s 36(3)). An owners corporation counts as suffering economic loss if it pays to fix defects covered by a breach (s 38(1)).
This duty cannot be handed off to someone else (s 39). It also cannot be excluded by contracts made or changed after Part 4 began (s 40). Part 4 operates subject to the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (s 41(3)).
A later Act, the Building (Approvals and Practitioners) Act 2026 (NSW), will repeal the 2020 Act once s 202(c) commences. Its Part 8 (ss 177–184) creates a similar duty, with its own definitions (s 179(1)–(2)). These provisions start on a day fixed by proclamation (s 2(b)). As at 3 October 2026, s 202(c) had not commenced, so the 2020 Act was still in force. Whether it has commenced since then needs separate checking.
In Pafburn Pty Limited v The Owners – Strata Plan No 84674 [2024] HCA 49, the joint judges said the 2020 Act was passed during a crisis of confidence among prospective apartment buyers. They noted Brookfield formed part of that context. But the actual question in Pafburn was about proportionate liability under Part 4 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) — a topic this article does not cover. Legislation from other jurisdictions is also outside its scope.
A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail, including whole topics, to stay short. The full article is the complete statement.