Issue, rule, application and conclusion in a High Court judgment

The facts the courts treated as significant

Mr Shirt was hurt water-skiing on Tuggerah Lakes in 1967. He hit the lake bed, where the water was three feet six inches to four feet deep.

He said he was inexperienced. He read a “DEEP WATER” sign as meaning the water past it was deep. A Shire engineer had put the sign up in 1966, after dredging finished.[^cite:wyong-shirt-issue-rule-application]

A jury found for Mr Shirt. The Court of Appeal of New South Wales upheld this by majority. The Shire appealed to the High Court.

Not all these facts mattered legally. Mason J’s reasoning relied on just three: the sign could suggest deep water lay beyond it, a skier might then ski in the shallow water in front, and an inexperienced skier falling there might strike the bed (Mason J, 48).

The issue is narrower than the case

This case was about negligence. But the real issue was much narrower than that.

The Shire had already conceded (accepted) that it owed water-skiers a duty of care. So duty was not in dispute. Mason J said the real question was whether the jury could reasonably find the Shire breached that duty.

More specifically, the Shire’s argument focused on one part of breach: whether the risk of injury was foreseeable.

This matters because it shows which statements in the judgment are actually load-bearing. It stops students citing the case for broader propositions the court never had to decide.

The rule, and a dispute about the rule

Quick Read: Here, the rule itself was disputed. Barwick CJ had earlier said a foreseeable risk must be “not unlikely to occur”. The alternative view said a risk is foreseeable if it is not far-fetched or fanciful, even if unlikely.

Mason J preferred the second view. He reasoned that foreseeability of a risk and the likelihood of it happening are different things.

Mason J then set out a two-step test for breach. First, ask whether a reasonable person would have foreseen a risk of injury to the plaintiff or a class including them. Second, ask what a reasonable person would do about that risk, weighing its magnitude and probability against the cost and difficulty of precautions, and any competing responsibilities.

Mason J stressed that foreseeability is only the first hurdle. Passing it does not itself establish breach.

Aickin J agreed fully with Mason J’s reasoning. Murphy J gave separate, brief reasons. Because of this, the article treats the test as Mason J’s, not the Court’s.

Application: the same rule, two answers

Wilson J dissented. But he did not reject the foreseeability test from The Wagon Mound (No 2). This test asks whether a reasonable person would have foreseen a real risk.

He disagreed on how the test applied to the facts. He read the evidence differently: the lake was long used for water-skiing, nothing warned the engineer of danger, and the signs targeted people near the jetty, not skiers. So he found no real risk, and would have allowed the appeal.

This shows two judges can accept the same rule but reach different conclusions. Knowing the rule is not enough. You must also know which facts persuaded each judge, and why.

The conclusion matches the issue

The Court dismissed the appeal. Mason J’s conclusion stays narrow and careful.

This was not an appeal about fact-finding. So Mason J did not decide that a reasonable person would definitely have foreseen the risk of injury.

He held only that the jury’s conclusion “was not unreasonable”. The evidence could support it.

This answers the exact issue: could the jury reasonably find breach? Mason J goes no further than that question.

Saying the Shire was negligent because the sign was ambiguous would go too far. That conclusion was never actually reached.

Where this case sits today

Shirt is a High Court decision, so it binds lower Australian courts. The High Court itself can still revisit its own past decisions.

Shirt is also a common-law decision. Legislation may now cover breach of duty instead, depending on your jurisdiction.

New South Wales is one example. Section 5B(1) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), as set out in Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420, says a person is not negligent for failing to take precautions unless the risk was foreseeable, “not insignificant”, and a reasonable person would have taken those precautions.

That judgment does not compare s 5B with Shirt. Working out how they relate is left to you, for your jurisdiction.

Check first whether a statute applies before picking which framework to use.

Self-check

Before you finish, check your work.

Make sure your issue is a specific question, not a broad topic.

Check that you have separated the rule from how the court applied it. Say which judge or judges gave the rule.

Confirm your conclusion only answers the issue you asked. Do not claim more than that.

Finally, check whether legislation in your jurisdiction governs the breach.

A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail, including whole topics, to stay short. The full article is the complete statement.

Read the full article →

Pop quiz

5 quick questions on this article, the authorities it cites and the articles it links to.

  • About 3 minutes, and no time limit.
  • You can only go forwards: each answer locks when you submit it.
  • After each question you see the right answer, why, and where to read more.
  • Free, and no account needed. Log in or create a free account to keep your scores.