Altering the constitution against a minority: Gambotto v WCP

Gambotto v WCP Ltd

In Gambotto v WCP Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 432, WCP Ltd had about 16.98 million shares. Subsidiaries of Industrial Equity Ltd held about 99.7 per cent of them.

They could not compulsorily acquire the rest under ss 414 and 701 of the Corporations Law. So WCP proposed a new article, Art 20A, letting any 90 per cent-plus shareholder compulsorily acquire the rest at $1.80 per share. An independent valuer put the shares at $1.365, a figure the appellants accepted as fair. The claimed benefits were tax savings and administrative savings from becoming a wholly owned subsidiary.

The majority (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ) held the new article invalid, reasoning in four steps.

First, they rejected the old “bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole” test from Allen v Gold Reefs. It did not fit a special resolution creating a conflict of interests.

Second, where no expropriation of shares or proprietary rights is involved, an alteration properly passed stays valid unless beyond the company’s power, outside its articles’ purpose, or oppressive.

Third, a power to expropriate needs more: it must serve a proper purpose and not operate oppressively on the minority. Expropriation can be justified if the minority’s continued holding harms the company, such as a competing member, and expropriation is a reasonable way to fix that harm.

Fourth, the alteration must also be fair. This has a procedural side, meaning disclosure of relevant information and, probably, an independent valuation, and a substantive side, concerned mainly with the price offered.

The Court also looked at the appellants’ alternative argument, though it did not need to. This relied on s 180(3)(c) of the Corporations Law, the forerunner to the transfer-restriction part of s 140(2). The Court largely accepted the respondents’ reply that Art 20A did not restrict transfer, since reading it that way would invalidate any amendment authorising similar arrangements.

Who must prove what

The joint reasons said the majority (those backing the expropriation) must prove they validly exercised the power. This is because a share gives more than just dividend rights -- it is a proprietary right, a legal interest in the company ([31]-[32]).

So the majority must prove both a proper purpose and fairness. The minority member need not prove the alteration was invalid. Since the appellants did not dispute the price was fair, the case turned only on proper purpose ([33]).

McHugh J reached the same outcome differently. He accepted the tax saving as a legitimate purpose, unlike the joint reasons. But he held the company failed to prove the expropriation was not oppressive, because it did not show fair dealing and full disclosure to the appellants ([23]-[25]).

The appeal was allowed. The test described above comes from the joint reasons of four Justices, not from McHugh J’s separate reasoning.

The statutory buy-out routes

The court’s joint reasons cautioned against allowing expropriation just because it was fair and helped the company. That approach could let companies sidestep minority protections built into compromises, schemes of arrangement and takeover offers.

The current Corporations Act has its own compulsory acquisition rules, separate from Gambotto. Under s 664A, a “90% holder” of a class of securities (defined in s 664A(1)-(2)) may compulsorily acquire the rest of that class for cash, generally at the same price per security.

This power only applies if objecting holders own less than 10% by value of the remaining securities at the end of the objection period, or if the Court approves anyway. It operates despite anything in the company’s constitution (ss 664A(3)-(4), 664B).

Section 661A gives a different power to a bidder under a takeover bid. That bidder may acquire securities in the bid class once certain thresholds are met, including holding relevant interests in at least 90% of the class.

Both mechanisms differ from the constitutional alteration process considered in Gambotto. Each comes with its own notice requirements and rights for security-holders to object.

This article does not look at cases after 1995 that applied Gambotto under the current Act. If a problem question depends on Gambotto’s present-day reach, check later authority.

Applying this in a problem question

Start by checking if the majority used a special resolution under s 136(2) to alter the constitution. Also check if s 140(2) means the affected member isn’t bound unless they agree in writing.

Next, ask if the change lets the company take the minority’s shares, or valuable rights attached to them — this is “expropriation”. If not, apply the general limits: the power must exist, be used for a purpose the constitution allows, and not be oppressive.

If expropriation is involved, apply the Gambotto test. This asks whether the change has a proper purpose, avoids oppression, and is fair in process and price. Those supporting the change carry the onus of proving this.

Check the stated purpose carefully. A tax advantage or administrative saving for the company or majority was held not enough on its own.

Also consider statutory alternatives, including Chapter 6A, and whether Part 2F.1 applies. Section 232 covers a resolution that is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial, or unfairly discriminatory against a member.

Note the leading statement comes from the joint reasons of four Justices, with McHugh J reasoning separately. The case was decided under the former Corporations Law.

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