Altering the constitution against a minority: Gambotto v WCP

When a majority may alter a company’s constitution to take over a minority’s shares: the High Court’s test in Gambotto v WCP Ltd, set against the current provisions on alteration and compulsory acquisition.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth
Subjects
corporations-and-commercial-law
Topics
members-rights

Learning outcomes

  • Explain the limits on a majority’s power to alter the constitution by special resolution, including the protections for individual members in s 140(2).
  • Apply the Gambotto test of proper purpose, absence of oppression and fairness, with its onus of proof, to an alteration that authorises compulsory acquisition of a minority’s shares.
  • Distinguish a constitutional alteration authorising expropriation from the statutory compulsory acquisition routes in Chapter 6A and from the oppression remedy.

A company can change its own constitution by special resolution, and a sufficient majority of members can pass one over the objection of the rest. The prior question for a student is therefore whether a majority may use that power to take away a minority’s shares at all. This article states Commonwealth law under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the High Court’s decision in Gambotto v WCP Ltd, which was decided under the former Corporations Law. The oppression remedy in Part 2F.1 is a separate protection, covered in the module’s article on members’ rights.

The power and its starting limits

Section 136(2) provides that a company “may modify or repeal its constitution, or a provision of its constitution, by special resolution”.A special resolution must be passed by at least 75% of the votes cast by members entitled to vote on it (s 250MA(b)).2 The constitution also operates as a contract between the company and each member and between the members themselves (s 140(1)). Section 140(2) protects an individual member from some alterations unless the member agrees in writing: a modification made after the member joined does not bind them so far as it requires them to take up additional shares, increases their liability to pay money to the company, or imposes or increases restrictions on the right to transfer shares they already hold, and the last of those has two exceptions. Those protections are specific. A modification that does none of those things is not caught by s 140(2) simply because it disadvantages a member, and the general limits on the power come from the case law.

Gambotto v WCP Ltd

In Gambotto v WCP Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 4321 WCP Ltd had about 16.98 million shares, of which its majority shareholders, wholly owned subsidiaries of Industrial Equity Ltd, held about 99.7 per cent. They could not have acquired the rest compulsorily under the statutory provisions then available (ss 414 and 701 of the Corporations Law), so WCP proposed a new article (Art 20A) letting any member entitled to 90 per cent or more of the shares compulsorily acquire the others at $1.80 per share. An independent valuation put the shares at $1.365, and the appellants accepted that valuation as fair. The benefits relied on were tax advantages and some administrative savings from becoming a wholly owned subsidiary (joint reasons at [2]-[4], [33]; McHugh J at [6]).

Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ, in joint reasons, held the new article invalid. Their analysis can be set out in four steps (the arrangement of the steps is this article’s):

  1. The old test is displaced. The formula “bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole” from Allen v Gold Reefs was rejected as inappropriate where a special resolution alters the articles and gives rise to a conflict of interests ([25]).
  2. Ordinary alterations remain valid unless defective. Where no expropriation of shares or valuable proprietary rights is involved, a regularly passed alteration is valid unless it is beyond the company’s power, outside any purpose contemplated by the articles, or oppressive ([25]).
  3. An alteration authorising expropriation needs more. Such a power can be taken only if it is exercisable for a proper purpose and its exercise will not operate oppressively on the minority ([26]). Expropriation may be justified where the minority’s continued holding is detrimental to the company, as with a competing member, and expropriation is a reasonable means of removing that detriment ([26]-[27]).
  4. Fairness is also required. The alteration must be fair in the circumstances, which has a procedural element, including disclosure of all relevant information and probably an independent valuation, and a substantive element concerned largely with price ([29]-[30]).

The Court also considered, though it was strictly unnecessary to do so, the appellants’ alternative argument under s 180(3)(c) of the Corporations Law, the predecessor of the transfer-restriction limb of s 140(2). It saw considerable force in the respondents’ answer that Art 20A did not restrict transfer, because a wider reading would invalidate any amendment authorising expropriation even if made for a proper purpose and fair ([35]-[36]).

The joint reasons added that it is not enough that an expropriation is fair and advances the interests of the company as a commercial entity or of the great majority of members ([28]). The tax and administrative benefits could not, by themselves, be a proper purpose, because they would follow from almost any majority buyout of a minority ([33]-[34]).

Who must prove what

The joint reasons placed the onus on those supporting the expropriation to show that the power was validly exercised, because a share is more than “a capitalized dividend stream” and confers proprietary rights ([31]-[32]). The majority therefore carries the burden of proving a proper purpose and fairness, and a minority member does not have to prove the alteration invalid. The appellants did not argue that the price was unfair, so the case was decided on proper purpose ([33]).

McHugh J reached the same result by a different route. Unlike the joint reasons, his Honour treated the tax saving as a legitimate objective, but held that the company had not proved the expropriation was not oppressive, because it had not shown that the appellants were dealt with fairly and that full disclosure was made (McHugh J at [23]-[25]). The Court allowed the appeal. The test set out above is the one in the joint reasons of four Justices.

The statutory buy-out routes

The joint reasons warned that allowing expropriation merely because it was fair and advanced the company’s interests would open the way to circumventing the protection the Corporations Law gave minorities who resist compromises, schemes of arrangement and takeover offers ([28]). The current Act has its own compulsory acquisition mechanisms. Under s 664A a “90% holder” of a class of securities (defined in s 664A(1)-(2)) may compulsorily acquire the rest of the class, for cash and generally the same amount per security, but only if holders who object hold less than 10 per cent by value of the remaining securities at the end of the objection period, or the Court approves; the power has effect despite anything in the company’s constitution (ss 664A(3)-(4), 664B).3 Section 661A gives a bidder under a takeover bid a power to acquire securities in the bid class where the thresholds in that section, including relevant interests in at least 90 per cent of the class, are met. These are different mechanisms from the constitutional alteration in Gambotto, with notices and objection rights of their own. This article does not canvass decisions after 1995 applying Gambotto to the current Act, so a problem question that turns on its present reach should be checked against later authority.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify whether the majority is using a special resolution to alter the constitution under s 136(2) and whether s 140(2) gives the affected member a right not to be bound without written agreement.
  2. Ask whether the alteration authorises expropriation of the minority’s shares or valuable rights attached to them. If it does not, apply the general limits: power, purpose contemplated by the constitution, oppression.
  3. If it does, apply Gambotto: proper purpose, absence of oppression, and fairness in process and price, with the onus on those supporting the alteration.
  4. Test the stated purpose. Tax advantage or administrative saving to the company or the majority was held insufficient on its own.
  5. Check the statutory alternatives in Chapter 6A, and whether Part 2F.1 is engaged: s 232 applies to a resolution or proposed resolution of members that is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly discriminatory against a member.4
  6. State that the leading statement is from joint reasons of four Justices, with McHugh J giving separate reasons, decided under the former Corporations Law.

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