New South Wales v Commonwealth
New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1
Five States and two unions asked the High Court to strike down the whole of the Work Choices legislation, which moved national workplace regulation onto the corporations power. Two Justices agreed with them; five did not.
What happened?
In 2005 Parliament passed the Work Choices Act, amending the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). It shifted reliance from s 51(xxxv) to s 51(xx). Seven actions challenged its validity; the Commonwealth demurred; plaintiffs argued s 51(xx) had limits.
What did the Court decide?
The Commonwealth’s demurrer was allowed in each action, with judgment for the Commonwealth and costs ([422]). Five Justices gave joint reasons. Kirby J and Callinan J each gave separate reasons and would have declared the Amending Act invalid. The joint reasons also dealt with other challenges, to the territories power, Schedule 6, s 16, s 117 and the regulation-making provisions.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The majority (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ) held the Work Choices amendments to the Workplace Relations Act were valid under s 51(xx). They rejected limiting the power to external corporate relationships, and rejected a separate “distinctive character” test.
They held s 51(xxxv) does not impliedly exclude industrial laws made under other powers. Part 7 was also valid under s 51(xx).
Failed referendums on ss 51(xx) and 51(xxxv) were irrelevant. Engineers’ Case didn’t forbid all constitutional implications, but “federal balance” arguments needed defined content, which plaintiffs lacked.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [197]–[198] (PDF p 93) (opens in a new tab), [246] (PDF p 112) (opens in a new tab)
The joint majority rejected the proposed internal/external distinction and additional characterisation filters, then applied its conclusion to uphold Part 7 as regulating constitutional corporations and their employment obligations. This reasoning was necessary to reject the corporations-power challenge to those provisions; it does not decide the validity of every conceivable law affecting corporations.
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [223] (PDF p 102) (opens in a new tab)
The joint majority rejected the claimed exclusivity of s 51(xxxv). This was necessary to defeat the separate argument that the industrial-relations character of the amendments prevented their support under s 51(xx), even though they regulated constitutional corporations.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [131]–[135] (PDF p 67) (opens in a new tab)
The joint majority rejected the use of these failed referendum proposals to narrow the powers relied on for the amendments. Their lack of equivalence to the questions before the Court and the difficulties in inferring constitutional meaning from referendum outcomes supplied reasons for rejecting an argument against validity. The ratio identified here concerns those proposals and these challenges, rather than every possible use of referendum history.
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [194]–[196] (PDF p 91) (opens in a new tab)
The joint majority distinguished implications grounded in constitutional text and structure from an independently assumed allocation of State legislative power. That distinction, and the plaintiffs’ failure to identify a constitutional limit through their federal-balance argument, were necessary to reject their proposed restrictions on s 51(xx). The quoted statements from Melbourne Corporation remain attributed to that authority; the present ratio is the joint majority’s application of the distinction to these challenges, not a complete definition of all structural limits.
Why does this case matter?
This case covers two issues: corporations power scope, and how courts interpret the Constitution. Students often confuse the two, or cite a dissent as the Court’s view.