Sharman v Evans

High Court of Australia · 1977

TortsTort Damages

Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563

A young quadriplegic was awarded $300,547.50. Three High Court Justices held it too high, by two different routes. How does a court test a figure for injuries it cannot really measure?

Qualified by Stewart v Metro North Hospital and Health Service [2025] HCA 34

In Stewart v Metro North Hospital and Health Service [2025] HCA 34, the joint reasons of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ say that Sharman’s outcome should be seen as concerning no “more than propositions of fact which were relevant to the case in hand” ([41]). For a claim for care at home, the inquiry starts from the plaintiff’s entitlement to be put, so far as money can do, in the position they would have been in without the tort, and asks whether the choice to incur the cost of home care is a reasonable response to repair the consequences of the tort, considering all the circumstances and the position before the tort ([44]). The assessment “is not confined to balancing only the health benefits against the cost” ([44]), and decisions that read Sharman as requiring that balance independently of the plaintiff’s choice were described as not correct ([43]). Once the choice is shown to be reasonable, it is for the defendant to establish that an alternative was unreasonably refused ([28], [51]). So take the reasonable-expense limit from Sharman, but state its application to home care through Stewart. The same reasons describe Gibbs and Stephen JJ’s step of fixing care costs before general damages as an approach that properly reduces the possibility of double counting ([53]).

What happened?

June Evans, twenty, was seriously injured in a December 1971 car accident. She became quadriplegic, with epilepsy, impaired breathing, and almost no speech. She had been training as a secretary and studying at a Bible college.

At trial in 1973, Sheppard J awarded $300,547.50, including $150,000–$175,000 for future care and $6,000 for shortened life expectancy. This assumed periods of home care, not permanent hospitalisation.

The NSW Court of Appeal dismissed Sharman’s appeal that damages were excessive. In the High Court, he repeated that argument and, for the first time, challenged the assumption of home care, despite earlier conceding it was reasonable.

What did the Court decide?

High Court allowed the appeal, 3–2. Barwick CJ, Gibbs and Stephen JJ for allowing; Jacobs and Murphy JJ dissenting. Judgment varied from $300,547.50 to $270,547.50; respondent to pay half the appellant’s costs of both appeals.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Gibbs and Stephen JJ said judges can value each head of damage separately, then discount or deduct. They rejected criticism of this method, so long as courts avoid compensating twice for the same loss. When a judge sits alone, the judgment should explain the main components, so parties can check for error. But separate figures only help test the total award. They do not by themselves fix the right amount.

Jacobs J agreed with this approach. Murphy J, dissenting, also called it convenient and proper. Barwick CJ gave separate reasons, warning against “undue elaboration”.

Gibbs and Stephen JJ also held that an award for lost earning capacity must be reduced where the care award already covers board and lodging. Otherwise the plaintiff is compensated twice. This deduction applies regardless of how she would actually have lived. Compensation is for net loss, so the cost of earning income (like fares and work clothing) is deducted too. But savings from foregone pleasure-spending are not deducted.

Jacobs J agreed on earning capacity. Barwick CJ found an overlap between economic loss and care differently. Murphy J, dissenting, would only set board and lodging against hospital costs, if at all.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Gibbs and Stephen JJ

Read judgment: p 572 (opens in a new tab), p 590 (opens in a new tab)

The head-by-head method, the need to avoid double compensation and the warning that the component figures did not determine the substituted total were necessary steps in the joint reasons’ conclusion that the award was excessive and in their calculation of the replacement award. They formed the dispositive reasoning of Gibbs and Stephen JJ, whose figure became the Court’s order.

Separate reasoning · Jacobs J

Read judgment: p 590 (opens in a new tab)

Jacobs J expressly concurred in the joint reasons’ analysis and in their balance between computation and assessment, but dissented from the order because he differed on two items of quantum. His agreement is therefore distinct reasoning in a judgment dissenting on the result, not part of the ratio supporting the Court’s order.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Gibbs and Stephen JJ

Read judgment: pp 576–578 (opens in a new tab), p 586 (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons used these principles to deduct board and lodging and income-earning outgoings, while declining to deduct foreclosed pleasure expenditure, in fixing the permissible range for lost earning capacity. That calculation was necessary to their conclusion that the total award was excessive and to the substituted award adopted in the Court’s order.

Separate reasoning · Jacobs J

Read judgment: p 590 (opens in a new tab)

Jacobs J expressly agreed with the principles stated by Gibbs and Stephen JJ on loss of earning capacity, but his judgment dissented from the result because of different assessments of two items. His adoption of the principles is separate reasoning rather than reasoning necessary to the Court’s order.

Proposition 3

Ratio · Gibbs and Stephen JJ

Read judgment: pp 573–575 (opens in a new tab), p 586 (opens in a new tab)

The reasonable-expense criterion and its application to hospital-based care determined the care-cost component used by Gibbs and Stephen JJ to show that the trial award was excessive and to calculate the substituted award. It was therefore necessary to their dispositive route, subject to the later qualification recorded from Stewart.

Obiter · Barwick CJ

Read judgment: p 567 (opens in a new tab)

Barwick CJ considered the home transfers not reasonably necessary, but expressly declined to reduce the award on that ground because the appellant had conceded their reasonableness. His view on necessity was therefore unnecessary to his separate decision to allow the appeal on other components and was obiter.

Why does this case matter?

Students tend to reach for this case as a source of dollar figures, and the figures are its least transferable part: they belong to 1973 to 1977 and to this plaintiff’s evidence, so they are no guide to the quantum of a claim today.

A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail. The full case note is the complete statement.