Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cunneen

High Court of Australia · 2015

Administrative LawStatutory Bodies

Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cunneen [2015] HCA 14

Conduct that makes an official’s job harder is not necessarily conduct that corrupts it. Which of the two does a corruption watchdog have power to investigate?

Clarified by legislation: Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW)

New South Wales legislated within months, but it did not undo this construction. The wording of s 8(2) that the Court construed -- “adversely affects, or that could adversely affect ... the exercise of official functions ... and which could involve any of the following matters” -- still stands, and Cunneen still tells you what it means. What the Independent Commission Against Corruption Amendment Act 2015 (NSW) did was add a new and separate limb, s 8(2A): corrupt conduct is also conduct “that impairs, or that could impair, public confidence in public administration” and which could involve one of five listed matters -- collusive tendering; fraud in relation to applications for licences or permits under legislation protecting health, safety or the environment or facilitating the management and commercial exploitation of resources; dishonestly obtaining or benefiting from public funds or public assets for private advantage; defrauding the public revenue; and fraudulently obtaining or retaining appointment as a public official. That is a targeted expansion into named categories, not a general reversal. Check which limb is engaged: s 8(2A) carries no probity requirement, but it reaches only its own list.

Qualified by Duncan v Independent Commission Against Corruption [2015] HCA 32

AND FOR ACTS BEFORE 15 APRIL 2015, PARLIAMENT REVERSED THE RESULT WITHOUT TOUCHING THE CONSTRUCTION -- so the date is the first thing to check. Cunneen was decided on 15 April 2015. New South Wales inserted Part 13 of Schedule 4 to the ICAC Act, headed (in the Act’s own words) “Validation relating to decision on 15 April 2015 in Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cunneen [2015] HCA 14”, comprising cl 34 (Interpretation) and cl 35 (Validation).

WHAT IT DOES, in the High Court’s description. Duncan v Independent Commission Against Corruption [2015] HCA 32, NETTLE AND GORDON JJ at [45]: Pt 13 “deems to be valid acts done by the respondent before 15 April 2015 to the extent that they would have been valid if corrupt conduct as defined in s 8(2) of the ICAC Act encompassed conduct which adversely affected the efficacy, but not the probity, of the exercise of official functions”. At [46] their Honours prefer to put it that cll 34 and 35 “do not amend s 8(2) ... in its application to acts done by the respondent prior to 15 April 2015” but “create a new or different legal regime in which, for a prescribed period of time, the concept of corrupt conduct ... is taken to be expanded to encompass conduct which adversely affected, or could adversely affect, the efficacy, but not the probity, of the exercise of official functions”, and then validate acts done in that period accordingly.

THE CHALLENGE TO IT FAILED.

FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL, BELL AND KEANE JJ at [32]: “The applicant’s challenge to the validity of Pt 13 fails.” At [25] they characterise cl 35 as a “retrospective conferral ... of the jurisdiction which was held lacking in Cunneen”, a grant of jurisdiction attaching “new legal consequences and a new legal status to things done which otherwise would not have had such legal consequences or status”.

SO THE PRACTICAL ORDER OF QUESTIONS IS: when were the ICAC acts done? Before 15 April 2015, Pt 13 may validate what this case would otherwise have invalidated, and Duncan holds that validation good. On or after that date, Cunneen’s construction governs s 8(2) -- and the separate s 8(2A) limb added by the 2015 Amendment Act, recorded in the entry above, may also be in play. None of this disturbs what s 8(2) MEANS, which is what this case decided and what a student is asked.

What happened?

ICAC wanted to investigate Margaret Cunneen SC, a senior Crown prosecutor, over an alleged allegation of advising someone to fake chest pains to stop police testing her blood alcohol. ICAC said this was “corrupt conduct” under s 8(2). The Court of Appeal disagreed; ICAC sought special leave to the High Court.

What did the Court decide?

Special leave was granted, the appeal treated as instituted and heard instanter, and dismissed with costs ([72]). Four judges to one — French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel and Nettle JJ, with Gageler J dissenting. ICAC could not investigate this allegation as corrupt conduct.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The majority held that under s 8(2), conduct “adversely affects” official functions only if it harms their probity, per s 8(1)(b)–(d). They said “adversely affects” has no plain meaning; it depends on context. A broader reading would capture unrelated crimes under “corrupt conduct.” Gageler J disagreed, saying mere impaired efficacy sufficed.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel and Nettle JJ

Read judgment: [45]–[46] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab), [71]–[72] (PDF p 31) (opens in a new tab)

The majority construed s 8(2) by reference to the forms of official improbity in s 8(1)(b)-(d), requiring an adverse effect on probity rather than mere impairment of efficacy. This construction was necessary to the dismissal of the appeal: it was undisputed that, on that construction, the alleged conduct was not corrupt conduct under s 8(2).

Separate reasoning · Gageler J (dissenting)

Read judgment: [74] (PDF p 32) (opens in a new tab), [82]–[83] (PDF p 34) (opens in a new tab)

Gageler J dissented and would have allowed the appeal. He read the statutory words as requiring only potential impediment or impairment of official functions, without an additional probity requirement, and read the objects clause as supporting that construction. This is his competing route to the opposite result, rather than the majority rule supporting this proposition.

Why does this case matter?

New South Wales amended the Act soon after. But s 8(2) still carries the words the Court interpreted, unchanged. Parliament added a separate s 8(2A), limited to five categories. Don’t assume the decision was simply reversed.

Check your understanding

Parliament amended the Act after this decision. Does that tell you the High Court construed s 8(2) wrongly — and does s 8(2) now mean something different?

A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail. The full case note is the complete statement.