Calverley v Green
Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242
Two people buy a house in both names, but one puts in far more of the purchase price. Who owns what when they separate?
Clarified by Bosanac v Commissioner of Taxation (2022) 275 CLR 37
The presumptions are a fallback, not a first step. Kiefel CJ and Gleeson J: the presumption of a resulting trust “can be rebutted by evidence from which it may be inferred that there was no intention on the part of the person providing the purchase money to have an interest in land (or other property) held on trust for him or her”, and it “cannot prevail over the actual intention of the party paying the purchase price as established by the overall evidence”; where more than one person pays, “regard is necessarily had to evidence of each of their intentions” ([13]). The presumption of advancement is described the same way -- it “allows an inference as to intention to be drawn from the fact of certain relationships” ([14]). Ms Bosanac held the Dalkeith property in her sole name and the Commissioner failed to establish that Mr Bosanac intended a beneficial interest; the appeal was allowed. A student who reaches for the presumption before reading the evidence of intention has the order backwards.
What happened?
Arthur Calverley and Dianne Green lived together as a de facto couple, 1968–1978. In 1973 they bought a house; Calverley paid the deposit, both were liable on the mortgage, and title was joint. Rath J found Green had no beneficial interest. The Court of Appeal held they owned it equally in equity.
What did the Court decide?
Neither earlier approach survived. The High Court left the precise interests to be determined, with a remittal to the Supreme Court if the parties could not agree.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
When one person pays for property put in another’s name, equity may presume a resulting trust. This gives the payer a share matching their contribution. A presumption of advancement, or evidence of contrary intention, can displace this.
Here the parties held the property as tenants in common, by contribution. Gibbs CJ asked first about intention, then applied the presumption. The $18,000 mortgage counted as paid equally, since liability was joint and several — who actually paid instalments didn’t matter for ownership, though it might affect later accounting.
Gibbs CJ’s figure (9,000/27,250) depended on unproven facts; it illustrates method only.
The judges split on advancement: Mason and Brennan JJ refused to extend it beyond marriage; Gibbs CJ would have applied it; Murphy J rejected the presumption entirely.
Shares are fixed at purchase. Later mortgage payments don’t alter interests, though they may ground contribution claims or equitable charges in some cases.
Why does this case matter?
The litigation moved from Green having no beneficial interest at trial to half on appeal, then to further proceedings after the High Court decision. An ownership dispute can leave practical work for the parties and their advisers even after the governing legal issue has been resolved.
Check your understanding
Green paid none of the deposit and, by their arrangement, none of the mortgage instalments. How should a court approach her claim to a beneficial interest?