The implied freedom of political communication
Foundation
The freedom is not a value the Court simply added to the Constitution. It is an implication, meaning something inferred rather than stated outright. It comes from ss 7, 24, 64 and 128, which set up representative and responsible government.
That system needs electors to communicate about political and governmental matters. The freedom exists only to make that system work. It goes no further than necessary for that purpose.
So the freedom protects communication on governmental and political matters, not expression generally. Things like commercial speech, art or personal abuse are only protected if they connect to political matters.
The freedom is also a limit on legislative and executive power, not a personal right. No one “has” it individually. The real question is whether a law is invalid, and a plaintiff need not show their own communication was burdened.
The questions
The test comes from Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, later reformulated in Coleman v Power. Courts now ask three questions.
First, does the law burden the freedom, in its terms, operation or effect? The burden can be direct or indirect, and need not be large. If there’s no burden, the analysis stops there.
Second, is the law’s purpose legitimate? This means it must fit with Australia’s system of representative and responsible government. A purpose is illegitimate if it targets political communication for its own sake, or otherwise conflicts with that system.
Third, is the law reasonably appropriate and adapted to achieve that legitimate purpose, consistently with the system of government? This third question involves the most detailed reasoning, and judges have taken different approaches to it.
Structured proportionality
McCloy v New South Wales (2015) set out a three-stage test for the third question in this area.
Suitability asks whether the law has a rational connection to its purpose. This is a low bar; a law only fails here if it cannot advance its stated aim.
Necessity asks if there was an obvious, equally workable alternative that burdens the freedom less. The court is not asking whether a better law is imaginable, only whether an obvious less restrictive option existed.
Adequacy in the balance asks whether the burden on the freedom outweighs the benefit of the law’s purpose. This step is evaluative, and is criticised most for importing a value judgment that belongs to parliament.
This structured approach is not accepted by every judge. Some prefer the older, undifferentiated “reasonably appropriate and adapted” test, or a calibrated approach where scrutiny varies with the burden’s nature and extent. A strong answer notes this division, rather than treating McCloy as settled law.
The doctrine shifted further in Babet v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] HCA 21. Gageler CJ and Jagot J said structured proportionality is just a way of organising reasons, a flexible “tool of analysis” that need not be expressly applied in every case. Gordon J agreed, and in that case found it unnecessary, and unhelpful, to apply the three steps at all. Beech-Jones J agreed with Gageler CJ and Jagot J.
The split widened again in Hopper v Victoria [2026] HCA 11. Edelman J said the first step is redundant and the third step has little remaining role. He suggested that, given a majority’s doubts about the test, structured proportionality might now be treated as dead. This is the view of only one justice. He would keep the second step, asking transparently whether the burden is reasonably justified.
Political communication and the common law
Lange also said the common law must fit with the Constitution. This led to a wider defence in defamation law called extended qualified privilege. It protects publishers discussing government and political matters, as long as their conduct was reasonable.
So the freedom affects both private law and statutes. But it works differently for each. A statute is invalid if it breaches the freedom. The common law, however, is simply developed to conform with it.
The freedom and the executive
The freedom also limits executive power, not just legislative power. An executive act can be invalid even if a valid statute allows it. This happens if the act burdens political communication beyond what the statute authorises.
Courts will read a general discretion as not covering a burden the freedom would forbid. This is how the freedom affects administrative decisions, like permit refusals or conditions on public land use.
When a discretion causes the burden, courts usually prefer to read the statute as not authorising it. This keeps the statute valid, but makes that particular use of power invalid.
Applying this in a problem question
Start by naming the law and the communication it burdens. Say clearly that the freedom limits government power; it is not a personal right people can individually claim.
Next ask whether the communication is about governmental or political matters. Many students skip this step and simply assume it applies.
Then show how the law burdens that communication, whether in its terms, its operation, or its effect. Describe how serious the burden is, because this matters later when balancing competing interests.
Identify the law’s purpose precisely, then test whether that purpose is compatible with the constitutional system of representative and responsible government.
Work through suitability, necessity and adequacy in order. Note that whether this structured proportionality approach even applies is itself debated among judges.
For necessity, name one specific, practicable alternative law. Explain why it is obviously just as effective but less burdensome. A vague claim that “something less restrictive” existed is not enough.
There is a deeper caveat. In LibertyWorks Inc v Commonwealth of Australia (2021) 274 CLR 1, Steward J questioned whether the implied freedom exists at all. He noted judges disagree about the test’s content, and suggested this disagreement might show the implication “was never justified.” He stopped short of rejecting it, since no party had challenged its existence in that case.
By contrast, in Babet, Gageler CJ and Jagot J said debate about how to test for a breach says nothing about whether the freedom itself is legitimate. So remember: the freedom remains settled law. Do not write that the High Court doubts its existence — only one judge raised that question.
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