Estoppel

The varieties

Common law estoppel has two main types. Estoppel by representation rests on an assumption about an existing fact. Estoppel by convention rests on facts both parties have agreed or assumed to be true, not on shared views about the law (Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd [2009] HCA 44, quoting Con-Stan Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Norwich Winterthur Insurance (Australia) Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 226).

Common law estoppel is evidentiary. This means it stops a party denying the assumed facts, and the court decides rights based on those facts. It does not by itself give a right to sue.

Equitable estoppel is different. It applies where a party assumes a legal relationship already exists, or expects one will exist, usually because of a promise.

Equitable estoppel splits into two kinds. Promissory estoppel involves an assumption that a legal relationship will change, or that a right won’t be enforced. Proprietary estoppel involves an assumption that the claimant has, or will get, an interest in the promisor’s property.

Australian law hasn’t settled whether these are really just one doctrine. Courts have sometimes leaned toward treating them as unified, without deciding the point. The safer approach is to identify which category applies, and mention the unresolved debate, rather than assume they’re the same thing.

This unification question also came up in Orr v Ford (1989) 167 CLR 316, though the case was actually decided using laches (a defence based on unreasonable delay in bringing a claim). Deane J, agreeing with Mason CJ on the laches point, suggested estoppel’s growth might eventually merge with doctrines like laches. However, he noted this argument hadn’t been raised, so he left the question open.

Separately, Wilson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ discussed a related scenario. They said that if a beneficiary’s inactivity caused the property holder to believe something and act on it, this would be an estoppel issue, not laches. They added that such an estoppel could potentially be used against the beneficiary’s claim, without finally deciding this on the facts before them.

The Australian expansion

English law kept promissory estoppel narrow. It could only modify a right that already existed under a contract. It worked as a shield, not a sword — a defence, not a way to start a new claim.

Australia went further. In Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988), the High Court allowed equitable estoppel to apply even with no existing legal relationship. This means a promise without consideration might still be enforceable, if the other elements of estoppel are met.

This matters whenever a promise fails for lack of consideration. Estoppel is a possible alternative, but not an automatic one. The elements still need to be proven, and the remedy may not simply be the promise itself.

How far this alternative goes depends on the type of estoppel. In Saleh v Romanous [2010] NSWCA 274, Handley AJA said a promissory estoppel only works defensively — it must be “negative in substance.” This differs from proprietary estoppel, which can support a positive claim.

In that case, the purchasers used estoppel to stop the vendors enforcing a sale contract. But estoppel did not act like a contract. It could not give them a positive right to rescind and get their deposit back. That repayment was instead based on a statutory provision.

So, at least in New South Wales, work out which category of estoppel applies before claiming a positive right from a promise.

Measuring the relief

Courts can measure relief two ways. The expectation measure gives the person what they were promised. The reliance measure instead compensates them for the loss they suffered trusting the promise.

In Australia, courts increasingly prefer the expectation measure for proprietary estoppel. But they may still give lesser relief if full enforcement would be disproportionate to the detriment suffered.

For estoppel by encouragement, Kramer v Stone says relief should match the detriment. If the detriment is small and easy to value in money, compensation is the likely remedy ([40]).

If the detriment involves major, irreversible personal decisions, courts are more likely to enforce the original promise ([40]).

Relief stays discretionary and flexible. Courts may order money, an interest in land, a lien, or delay the order’s effect.

Applying this in a problem question

Start by pinpointing the assumption exactly. Work out whether it concerns an existing fact or something in the future.

Next, name which category of estoppel applies. Note that the unification question remains unresolved, and raise it if it matters here.

Then work through the elements in order. Give the most attention to inducement and detrimental reliance.

Assess detriment as a whole, judged at the point the party departs from the assumption.

Finally, argue explicitly what the remedy should be. Don’t simply assume the promise will be enforced.

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