Whitlock v Brew

High Court of Australia · 1968

ContractContract Formation

Whitlock v Brew (1968) 118 CLR 445

A land sale required the buyer to lease part of the site to an oil company on reasonable terms. Nobody said what those terms were.

What happened?

Land was sold on terms requiring the purchaser to grant a lease of part of it to a petroleum supplier, on such reasonable terms as commonly govern such a lease. What those terms were was never spelled out, and there was no evidence of what terms were in fact common for leases of that kind. The same clause did provide for arbitration — but of “any dispute between the parties as to the interpretation or operation of this clause”.

What did the Court decide?

The clause could not be given content: there was no agreement on the duration of the term or the rent, and no evidence of what terms were in fact common. The arbitration provision did not save it, because on the majority’s reading it could not have authorised an arbitrator to impose terms on the purchaser — to do that would be to alter the contract rather than to interpret it. Because the clause could not be severed, the contract as a whole failed and the purchaser recovered the deposit. McTiernan J dissented, holding the covenant sufficiently certain.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Where the parties have not agreed the essential terms of the bargain, the agreement is incomplete and unenforceable unless the court has an objective standard by which those terms can be determined, or the contract empowers someone to determine them.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Taylor, Menzies and Owen JJ

Read judgment: p 461 (opens in a new tab)

Their joint reasons held that the lease covenant neither specified nor provided a means of determining the duration or rent. They rejected the construction that the arbitrator could settle those terms. This was necessary to their finding of uncertainty; their further conclusion that the condition was inseverable made the whole contract fail. The reasoning concerns the missing essential lease terms and the actual scope of this arbitration clause.

Ratio · Kitto J

Read judgment: p 457 (opens in a new tab)

Kitto J concurred in dismissing the vendor’s appeal. He held that an ascertainable set of reasonable terms in common use could have supplied the lease terms, but none had been established. The arbitrator could resolve disputes about such existing terms, but could not impose terms he thought ought to govern. This reasoning was necessary to his conclusion that the lease covenant had no contractual effect, before he held it inseverable. It supports the objective-standard aspect of the proposition through his own reasons, rather than attributing that formulation to the joint judgment.

Separate reasoning · McTiernan J

Read judgment: pp 454–456 (opens in a new tab)

McTiernan J dissented on the vendor’s appeal. He inferred the lease duration from the surrounding circumstances, treated the agreed requirement of reasonable rent as sufficient, and placed on the purchaser the burden of showing that common lease terms did not exist. He would therefore uphold the covenant. His approach explains the disagreement about whether the missing terms were ascertainable; it is not the majority’s ground for invalidating the bargain.

Why does this case matter?

It is the case that stops “reasonable” doing work it cannot do. A drafter who cannot agree something and writes in a reasonableness formula has often not solved the problem but hidden it, and this shows the cost: the whole bargain went, not just the clause.

That severance point is the part most often missed. Whether an uncertain provision takes the contract with it depends on how central it is to what the parties agreed, so the analysis does not end once uncertainty is established.

Exam and application relevance

Start by naming which terms are missing and whether they are essential to the bargain — an incomplete agreement is not the same as one that is merely vague, and this case is about the former. Then ask what a court would actually do if asked to enforce it tomorrow: is there a formula, a market standard, a named third party with real power over the gap? If the court would have to write the bargain, the term fails; then ask separately whether the rest survives without it.

Check your understanding

The contract did provide for an arbitrator. Why did that not make the lease covenant certain?