Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan

House of Lords · 1940

TortsPrivate Nuisance

Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880

A council trespassing on a farm ditch laid a pipe without a proper guard, and years later a storm choked it and flooded the neighbour’s garden. Could the neighbour sue the landowner, who had not laid the pipe?

What happened?

The appellant, Sedleigh-Denfield, owned and occupied a house and garden at 1 Victoria Road, Mill Hill. To the north of his plot was a field owned by the respondents, the trustees of the St Joseph’s Society for Foreign Missions, with a hedge along its southern edge and a ditch south of the hedge (Viscount Maugham). The courts below treated the ditch as the respondents’ land, and the Law Lords took the same view (Viscount Maugham; Lord Porter).

Before 1934 the ditch continued as an open watercourse along the northern edge of a block of flats called Holcombe Court. In 1934 the then owner of Holcombe Court made an agreement with the Middlesex County Council under which the Council was to substitute a 15-inch pipe or culvert for the ditch along that side of the block. She had no right to do that, because the ditch was the respondents’ property; the Council nonetheless made the culvert and covered it with earth (Viscount Maugham). The Council recognised the need for a grating and provided one, but its workman placed it on top of the culvert, where it was useless, instead of in the ditch a couple of feet from the opening (Viscount Maugham). The mouth of the culvert was on the respondents’ land (Viscount Maugham).

Brother Dekker, who was responsible for cleaning the ditch when the work was done, saw it in progress, assumed it was being done with the respondents’ consent and did not report it to his superior (Viscount Maugham). The respondents’ helpers or servants went on cleaning out the ditch periodically (Viscount Maugham). Branson J accepted that the respondents did not become aware of the construction of the culvert, with its unguarded entrance, until after the flood (Viscount Maugham). On 20 April 1937, after a heavy storm, the culvert became blocked with refuse and the appellant’s premises were flooded, causing substantial damage (Viscount Maugham).

The respondents did not argue that the rainfall was so exceptional that it amounted to an act of God (Viscount Maugham). Expert evidence, which the trial judge accepted, was that a grating placed properly in the ditch at a proper distance from the culvert would have prevented the blockage (Viscount Maugham).

The appellant had entered into occupation in February 1937, and he issued a writ on 3 November 1937 claiming damages for negligence and nuisance; before the House of Lords only the claim in nuisance was pursued (Lord Porter). Branson J dismissed the action and the Court of Appeal, in a judgment delivered by Mackinnon LJ, affirmed, relying on two earlier decisions, Saxby v Manchester and Sheffield Railway Co and Job Edwards Ltd v Birmingham Navigations (Lord Wright; Lord Porter). The appellant appealed to the House of Lords.

What did the Court decide?

The House of Lords allowed the appeal. Viscount Maugham, Lord Atkin, Lord Wright, Lord Romer and Lord Porter each delivered a speech and all five agreed in the result. Lord Atkin said that the orders of the trial judge and the Court of Appeal should be set aside and judgment entered for the plaintiff for damages to be assessed, and Viscount Maugham said that the appeal should be allowed for damages to be assessed, with costs here (as for a pauper appellant) and below.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

All five Law Lords held the respondents answerable for the flooding although the council, a trespasser, had made the culvert, but they did not all put the ground of liability in the same words. Viscount Maugham said that “all that is necessary in such a case is to show that the owner or occupier of the land with such a possible cause of nuisance upon it knows or must be taken to know of it”. An occupier “continues” a nuisance “if with knowledge or presumed knowledge of its existence he fails to take any reasonable means to bring it to an end though with ample time to do so”, and “adopts” it “if he makes any use of the erection, building, bank or artificial contrivance which constitutes the nuisance”; he added “I am not attempting exclusive definitions” (at 894).

He held that the respondents had continued the nuisance because they neglected “the very simple step of placing a grid in the proper place”, and had adopted it because they “continued during all that time to use the artificial contrivance of the conduit for the purpose of getting rid of water from their property without taking the proper means for rendering it safe”. Lord Romer agreed with Viscount Maugham’s account of what it is to “continue” a nuisance (at 913), and also held that the respondents “continued thereafter to use the ditch for the purpose of draining their adjoining fields without taking steps to ensure that the water did not accumulate therein and as a consequence flood the Appellant’s premises”, so that they had committed a nuisance for which they must be held responsible.

Lord Atkin defined nuisance, for the purpose of deciding whether the plaintiff could establish a private nuisance, as “a wrongful interference with another’s enjoyment of his land or premises by the use of land or premises either occupied or in some cases owned by oneself”. He said that the occupier “is not an insurer” and that “Deliberate act or negligence is not an essential ingredient but some degree of personal responsibility is required” (at 897). For him, “if a man permits an offensive thing on his premises to continue to offend, that is if he knows that it is operating offensively, is able to prevent it and omits to prevent it he is permitting the nuisance to continue, in other words he is continuing it” (at 897).

He found that the respondents, “by their responsible agents”, had knowledge of the erection of the pipe, of the reasonable expectation that it might be obstructed and of the result of that obstruction, and that “they knew the danger, they were able to prevent it and they omitted to prevent it”. He added that “It is possible that the question how far a person is liable for injury to a neighbour’s land from a cause emanating from his own land where he himself is ignorant of the cause or effect has still to be determined”.

Lord Wright said that the rule had not been laid down by the House but had “been rightly established in the Court of Appeal” that an occupier is not responsible for a nuisance created without his knowledge and consent unless a further condition is met, “namely, that he had knowledge or means of knowledge, that he knew or should have known of the nuisance in time to correct it and obviate its mischievous effects”. He said “The liability for a nuisance is not, at least in modern law, a strict or absolute liability”, and that an occupier who has taken over the nuisance “ready made as it were”, or whose nuisance is due to a latent defect or to the act of a trespasser or stranger, is not liable “unless he continued or adopted the nuisance” or, in what he called the more accurate form, unless he “did not without undue delay remedy it when he became aware of it, or with ordinary and reasonable care should have become aware of it” (at 904-905).

His reason was that the responsibility which attaches to the occupier because of possession and control of the property “cannot logically be limited to the mere creation of the nuisance”, and he treated the respondents, by their servant, as persons who knew or at least ought to have known of it.

Lord Porter said that “the true view is that the occupier of land is liable for a nuisance existing on his property to the extent that he can reasonably abate it, even though he neither created it nor received any benefit from it”, and that “It is enough if he permitted it to continue after he knew or ought to have known of its existence”; “To this extent, but to no greater extent, he must be proved to have adopted the act of the creator of the nuisance”.

He treated the trustees as affected by the knowledge of the brother to whom they had entrusted the farm and the care of the ditch. To the argument that the respondents knew only that the pipe had no grid and not that any trouble would follow, he answered that they “ought, I think, as reasonable persons to have recognized the probability or at least the possibility of a flood occurring”. Lord Porter described Broder v Saillard as showing that “an occupier may be liable though he (1) is wholly blameless, (2) is not only ignorant of the existence of the nuisance but also without means of detecting it, and (3) entered into occupation after the nuisance had come into existence”. Lord Atkin had said that, if no more than that could be said of Broder v Saillard and similar cases, such cases “impose very stringent liabilities”.

Lord Wright said that the Court of Appeal had decided the case on a rule it derived from Job Edwards Ltd v Birmingham Navigations, namely that where a trespasser has created a private nuisance on a man’s land he is not liable for it, and that even a failure or refusal on his part to remove it does not involve him in liability for its results; he inferred that the Court of Appeal was relying on the authority of that case and of Saxby v Manchester and Sheffield Railway Co rather than on its own view of whether they were correct.

The Law Lords did not accept that approach. Of Saxby, Viscount Maugham said “It is impossible to regard this case as an authority for holding that if a nuisance is created by a trespasser’s act, the occupier of the land is necessarily free from liability if damage is caused to an adjoining owner”, and he could not agree with the distinction Bankes LJ drew in Job Edwards between an occupier’s duty in a public nuisance and in a private nuisance.

Lord Atkin said that he could not think that the obligation not to “continue” a nuisance can have a different meaning in public and in private nuisance; he thought that Saxby could be supported only on its special facts and that, if the opinions of its judges were treated as of general application, they were “contrary to principle and the decision must be overruled”. Lord Romer said that Job Edwards, “in so far as it draws a distinction between the continuance of a private nuisance and the continuance of a public nuisance ought not to be followed”, and that Saxby appeared to be an authority rather in favour of than adverse to the liability of an occupier who continues a nuisance created by another.

Lord Porter could see no ground on which the distinction between public and private nuisance could be supported and said that Job Edwards was not an authority for the proposition laid down by the Court of Appeal. Lord Wright agreed with Scrutton LJ’s opinion in Job Edwards on all the points he had mentioned, and said that a common law right to abate extrajudicially “cannot exclude a claim for damages for detriment suffered”.

On abatement, Lord Atkin said that it “affords no remedy at all for damage actually done”. Lord Porter said that even if the appellant could have entered the respondents’ land after notice and put the grid in its proper place, “he was not obliged to do so”.

Why does this case matter?

A defendant who says that someone else made the hazard is common in problem questions about land, and this is the House of Lords decision that students are expected to bring to those facts. It is a case to read in the speeches rather than through a headnote, since an answer is stronger when it names the Law Lord whose words it uses.

Exam and application relevance

Set out the facts in order of time: who made the thing that caused the harm, who held the land when it was made and when the harm occurred, who knew of it and when, and what was done about it afterwards. Say which Law Lord’s wording you apply, and compare what Lord Wright, Lord Atkin and Lord Porter each say about an occupier who lacked knowledge or the means of knowledge.

This is a House of Lords decision about a flooding nuisance. For an Australian answer, check which Australian authorities and which civil liability legislation of the relevant jurisdiction apply before treating its wording as the governing statement. Lord Wright’s wider statements in the same speech about the nature of nuisance and the reasonableness of an interference are a separate subject, and the current Australian statement of when an interference with the use and enjoyment of land is actionable should be taken from Australian authority.

Check your understanding

1. Where did the Council’s workman place the grating, and where would it have intercepted refuse (Viscount Maugham)?

2. What did Brother Dekker see and do, and what did Branson J accept about when the respondents became aware of the culvert (Viscount Maugham)?

3. Which two earlier decisions did the Court of Appeal rely on, and what did Lord Wright infer about its reasons for doing so?

4. What two meanings did Viscount Maugham give to continuing and adopting a nuisance, and what did he say about them as definitions?

5. What did Lord Atkin say might still have to be determined, and which statement of Lord Porter should be compared with it?

6. What did Lord Wright say about the effect of a common law right to abate on a claim for damages, and what did Lord Atkin say abatement affords for damage already done?