Parliamentary Inspector of the Corruption and Crime Commission (WA) 

Act: Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003 (WA), Part 13.¹

Established: 1 January 2004, when Part 13 of the Act commenced — the same date the CCC itself began operating.

Purpose: A body with the CCC's coercive investigative powers needs its own watcher. The Parliamentary Inspector exists to audit the CCC itself, not to duplicate its work or to review the merits of what it investigates — with one confined exception under s 196, below.

Powers conferred under the Act

Under Part 13, the Parliamentary Inspector's main functions are to:

• audit the operation of the Act generally;
• audit the CCC's own operations, including compliance with WA law and allegations of misconduct by CCC officers; and
• report to the Joint Standing Committee on the Corruption and Crime Commission, either on the Inspector's own initiative, at the Minister's request, in response to a complaint, or on referral from either House of Parliament.

The role is audit and report, not adjudication — the Parliamentary Inspector does not decide individual cases or exercise the CCC's own investigative powers over the public generally.

Is it a prosecuting authority?

No prosecuting function — but be careful with the second half of that proposition, because there is a narrow merits power and it is examinable. Section 196(4) requires the Commission to notify the Parliamentary Inspector of any allegation concerning one of its own officers, and lets the Inspector review how the Commission dealt with it. Under s 196(5) the Inspector may remove the matter for consideration and determination, and the Commission must comply (s 196(6)). On removal, s 196(7) lets the Inspector annul the Commission's determination and substitute another, or make any decision it might have made in original jurisdiction. Annulling and substituting a determination is merits review in substance.

What remains true is the general position: the Inspector does not sit as a merits-review body over the CCC's investigations at large. The s 196 power is confined to allegations about CCC OFFICERS — the accountability of the watchdog itself, which is the whole reason the office exists. So the answer is "no, except over the CCC's handling of complaints about its own people", not a flat no.

Self-check

• Have I distinguished auditing the CCC's own conduct from investigating corruption generally (that is the CCC's job, not the Inspector's)?
• Have I noted that the Inspector reports to the Joint Standing Committee, not to the executive government of the day?
• Have I avoided describing the Inspector as a merits-review or prosecuting body?